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Abstract
Central banks adopt an inﬂation targeting policy with a goal to anchor inﬂation expectations. We argue that
the expectations anchoring test developed in the context of the Krugman (1991) exchange rate targeting
model is well-suited for inﬂation targeting applications. The test quantiﬁes nonlinearity between realized and
expected inﬂation for very high and very low inﬂation levels. It does not require comparison with the control
group of non-targeting countries, avoiding critique of the benchmark approach. We test inﬂation targeting
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and ﬁnd weak support for expectations
anchoring.
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High inﬂation fuels future expectations of even higher inﬂation. To anchor inﬂation expectations, a central
bank adopts the inﬂation targeting policy by making a promise to contain inﬂation inside announced bounds.
With a trustworthy central bank, there is no reason to expect high inﬂation in the future, even if inﬂation
is high today. Similarly, there is no reason to expect deﬂation in the future, even if inﬂation is very low
today. As a result, for very high and very low levels of inﬂation, inﬂation targeting weakens the link between
realized and expected inﬂation.
Inﬂation targeting is gaining popularity despite an ongoing empirical debate on whether this policy
is successful at anchoring inﬂation expectations.1 Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004), Gurkaynak, Levin,
and Swanson (2006) provide evidence favoring the view that inﬂation targeting plays a signiﬁcant role
in anchoring inﬂation expectations. Other studies conclude that the policy does not change expectations
formation. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Svensson (1995), Johnson (1998) show that in
the ﬁrst few years after adopting inﬂation targeting, expected inﬂation exceeds realized inﬂation. Johnson
(2002) demonstrates that the policy does not reduce dispersion of inﬂation forecasts. Ball and Sheridan
(2005) show that the inﬂation targeting policy does not change signiﬁcantly the relation between one-year
ahead inﬂation expectations and realized inﬂation.
The benchmark test of expectation anchoring, used by Ball and Sheridan(2005) and Levin, Natalucci, and
Piger (2004), regresses inﬂation expectations on realized inﬂation in two groups of countries: the targeting
group and the non-targeting group. A signiﬁcantly smaller coeﬃcient on realized inﬂation in the targeting
group is interpreted as evidence of the weak link between realized and expected inﬂation. Even though the
choice of the inﬂation targeting countries is obvious, Gertler (2005) and Uhlig (2004) point out that the
choice of non-inﬂation targeting countries is hard to defend. Some central banks, in particular the central
banks of Germany and the U.S., intervene to lower inﬂation rates, as inﬂation targeting countries do. Also,
European countries had to satisfy inﬂation criteria to join the European monetary union, even though they
did not adopt explicit inﬂation targeting.
We propose an alternative expectations anchoring test that is based on the Krugman (1991) model.
Following Amano, Black and Kasumovich (1997) and Tetlow (2000), we argue that the Krugman model,
developed in the context of exchange rate targeting, is applicable to inﬂation targeting. Our test does
not require comparison with a control group of non-targeting countries, avoiding critique of the benchmark
approach. In addition to the test, our approach allows us to measure the degree of expectation anchoring
and the strength of anticipated central bank interventions. We test inﬂation targeting in Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and ﬁnd weak support for expectations anchoring.
1Seventeen central banks (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Korea, New
Zealand, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom) have adopted explicit inﬂation
targeting (IT) over the past two decades.
1Amano, Black and Kasumovich (1997) and Tetlow (2000) conclude that, after allowing for inﬂation to
break the limits of target zone, the Krugman model should be useful for an empirical evaluation of inﬂation
targeting regimes. Even though Krugman developed his model in a context of exchange rate targeting, the
two policies are similar. Exchange rate and inﬂation targeting policies have the same goal (to make the target
variable more predictable), use interventions to achieve this goal, and allow infrequent breaks of the target
zone. The main diﬀerence is that interventions aﬀect an exchange rate faster than inﬂation, but still not
fast enough to keep an exchange rate inside the target zone at all times. Our empirical model describes the
behavior of the target both inside and outside the target zone allowing for the target to break the bounds.
When applied to inﬂation targeting, the Krugman model predicts that the link between realized and
expected inﬂation is nonlinear: The link weakens as inﬂation approaches the boundaries. For example, when
inﬂation is high, agents in economy anticipate central bank intervention.2 The anticipated intervention
makes the probability of higher inﬂation in the future small compared to the probability of lower inﬂation.
Even though current inﬂation is high, it does not translate into high expected inﬂation, weakening the link
between realized and expected inﬂation close to the boundary. This nonlinearity is a testable implication of
the Krugman model, applied to inﬂation targeting.
We test for the nonlinear dependence of expected and realized inﬂation using the Forbes and Kofman
(2000) version of the Krugman model.3 The Forbes and Kofman model retains the nonlinear dependence
while allowing for the target variable to leave the target zone. In addition, the alternative where expectations
depend linearly on realized inﬂation, resulting from a failure of inﬂation targeting to anchor expectations,
is nested in this model. The nested test is preferable to the Ruge-Murcia (2000) test where linear and non-
linear dependence are non-nested, which results in complicated asymptotic tests with unclear small sample
properties. The complications make Ruge-Murcia conclude that the evidence of nonlinearity “should be best
regarded only as indicative”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we argue that the Krugman model is applicable
in the context of inﬂation targeting. In Section 3, we discuss the model setup, while Section 4 discusses
estimation. Details on the data are contained in Section 5, and empirical results are gathered in Section 6.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 7. Appendix illustrates the methodology for the daily Norwegian
exchange rate index.
2Krugman assumes that interventions occur when the target variable is at the upper or lower bound. Delgado and Dumas
(1991) extend the result to interventions that occur inside the target zone.
3Alternative empirical approaches in the context of exchange rate targeting can be found in Lundberg and Terasvirta (2006),
Li (1999), Pesaran and Ruge-Murcia (1999) among many others.
22 Inﬂation Versus Exchange Rate Targeting
Amano, Black and Kasumovich (1997), and Tetlow (2000), consider applicability of the Krugman model to
inﬂation targeting. Both papers conclude that even though the monetary authority is not able to control
inﬂation instantaneously, the model that incorporates the ability of the target variable to break the limits
of target zone should still retain nonlinearity of expectations and thus should be useful for an empirical
evaluation of inﬂation targeting regimes.
Exchange rate and inﬂation targeting policies have a similar goal, use interventions to achieve it, and
have similar ﬂexibility in implementing the policy. The goal of both policies is to make a target variable –
inﬂation or exchange rate – more predictable. Both policies achieve predictability by promising to keep the
target variable inside the speciﬁed bounds. When the target variable is close to the bounds, a central bank
intervenes to bring it back to the center of the target zone. Finally, both policies are ﬂexible – a central
bank allows the target to move outside the zone or even can change the bounds of the zone.
Though there are important similarities between exchange and inﬂation targeting regimes, there are also
two diﬀerences, which we address in our empirical model. The obvious diﬀerence is the target variable. For
an exchange rate policy, the target variable is the price level of one currency in terms of the other. Most price
levels, including the exchange rates, are unit root processes. To address nonstationarity, empirical models of
exchange rate are written in ﬁrst diﬀerences. For inﬂation targeting policy, the target variable is the change
in price level. The target variable is already a ﬁrst diﬀerence of aggregate price level. Inﬂation is persistent
but stationary. Stationarity implies that an empirical model does not require diﬀerence transformation and
can be estimated in levels. To account for inﬂation persistence, we introduce lagged inﬂation. Our empirical
model nests the model in diﬀerences when we restrict inﬂation autocorrelation to be equal to one.
The more important diﬀerence is that the period between intervention and its eﬀect is much longer for
inﬂation targeting. Inﬂation targeting intervention changes an interest rate. A change in interest rate aﬀects
inﬂation with a delay that can be as long as one year. Exchange rate policy intervention is a change in supply
of foreign currency. A change in supply aﬀects exchange rate with a short or no delay. Still there are instances
when the eﬀect of interventions is not fast enough to keep an exchange rate inside the target zone at all
times. Our empirical model allows for a delay between a policy intervention and the target variable response
by describing the behavior of the target variable both inside and outside the target zone. Also, diﬀerent data
frequency mitigates a longer intervention delay for inﬂation targeting. Exchange rate observations have a
daily frequency, while the frequency of inﬂation observations is monthly or even quarterly. One period delay
for exchange rate means a single day, while for inﬂation it could be a month or even a quarter.
33 Target Zone Model
Our model of the target variable is an autoregressive time series. Inﬂation lags explain signiﬁcant part of
inﬂation variation in many empirical evaluation of structural models.4 We build on the Forbes and Kofman
(2000) target zone model, which modiﬁes and extends the Bekaert and Gray (1998) model.
Let Ut be an upper bound, Ct be a center, and Lt be a lower bound of a target zone. Subscript t
indicates that a monetary policy can change the design of the target zone by changing the bounds or the
center of the target zone. We deﬁne a general target variable τt by normalizing inﬂation or exchange rate,
τt = 2(xt −Ct)/(Ut −Lt), where xt is either exchange rate or inﬂation. By normalizing a target variable, we
also normalize the target zone: the center is equal to zero, the lower bound is equal to −1, and the upper
bound is equal to 1. The target model then becomes:
τt = c + a(L)τt + ǫt, t = 1,2,...,T (1)
where a(L) = a1L + a2L2 + ... is a polynomial lag operator and c is a constant. The goal of a targeting
policy is to keep the target variable τt inside the target zone [−1,1]. Anticipated central bank interventions
in our model modify the error term. If agents in economy do not anticipate interventions, the error term in
equation (1) has the Normal distribution. The anticipated interventions are incorporated in the model by
restricting the values that error term ǫt can take.
3.1 Perfectly Credible Target Zone
We call the target zone perfectly credible when agents in economy believe that the central bank keeps the
target variable within the bounds −1 ≤ τt ≤ 1 at all times, t = 1,2,...,T. This belief is incorporated via the
error term, error can never be too large or too small to move the target outside the target zone. Such error





















where 1A(x) is an indicator function which takes on a value 1 if x ∈ A and zero otherwise, φ( ) and Φ( ) are
the standard Normal density and cumulative distribution functions, σ is a standard deviation of the error
term, Uǫ
t = 1 − c − a(L)τt and Lǫ
t = −1 − c − a(L)τt are the minimum and maximum values that the error
4See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003) for the representative empirical evaluations
of structural models. See Fuhrer(2005), Rudd and Whelan (2005), Korenok, Radchenko and Swanson (2006) for a detailed
discussion on importance of lags in structural models.
4term can take. The target variable is at the upper bound when the error term is equal to Uǫ
t. The target is
at the lower bound when the error term is equal to Lǫ
t.




























Expectation is a function of σ, Lǫ
t and Uǫ
t. The values of Lǫ
t and Uǫ
t in turn are functions of the position of
the target variable in the zone c + a(L)τt. In perfectly credible target zone, the Krugman model, applied
to inﬂation targeting, predicts that expected inﬂation depends nonlinearly on realized inﬂation, or more
generally, on the position in the zone. In our model, the only source of nonlinearity is expectation of the
error term, which depends nonlinearly on the position in the zone.
The nonlinear dependence, illustrated by the solid line in Figure 1, has the S-shape form: expectation
is zero around the center, negative at the upper bound, and positive at the lower bound. Without loss of
generality, assume the target variable follows a pure random walk, a(L) = L and c = 0, then the position
in the zone refers to the value of the target variable in the last period τt−1, for example, realized inﬂation.
When realized inﬂation is at the center of the zone τt−1 = 0, agents in economy do not anticipate central
bank interventions, and the distribution of error term is symmetric with the support [Lt = −1,Ut = 1] and
zero mean. When realized inﬂation is high, close to the upper bound τt−1 = 1, agents anticipate central
bank to intervene, brining inﬂation down. As a result, the right tail of the error distribution is truncated
more with the support [−2,0]. This distribution is skewed to the left with a negative mean, which reﬂects
agents’ anticipation of future central bank interventions. Similarly, when realized inﬂation is near the lower
bound, the error distribution is skewed to the right with positive mean, reﬂecting agents’ anticipation of
central bank interventions.
3.2 Non-Perfectly Credible Target Zone
We call a target zone non-perfectly credible when agents in economy anticipate target variable to move
outside the zone because of a delay between a central bank intervention and a target variable response. In










































5where agents anticipate the target variable to move outside the zone with probability αt. This probability
is restricted by a maximum value α∗:
αt = min{α∗, ˜ αt}. (4)















We interpret ˜ αt as an unrestricted probability of the target variable to leave the zone, i.e., agents anticipate
no central bank interventions; αt = min(α∗, ˜ αt) as a restricted, adjusted by the anticipation of central
bank interventions, probability of the target variable to leave the zone; and α∗ as a restriction imposed by
anticipated central bank interventions.
In our model agents incorporate anticipated central bank interventions restricting the distribution of
the error term. A target variable is outside the zone when the error term is outside the interval [Lǫ
t,Uǫ
t].















, which is a deﬁnition of ˜ αt.
When the position of the target is close to the center, the probability of breaking the zone without
intervention ˜ αt is small. Agents do not anticipate central bank interventions, leaving the probability of
breaking the zone unrestricted αt = ˜ αt. But, as the position of the target variable in the zone moves
closer to the bound, the probability of breaking the target zone increases. Anticipated interventions decrease
the probability of moving outside the target zone from ˜ αt to a constant α∗. Interventions improve policy
credibility by making the move outside the target zone less likely, thus decreasing α∗. Figure 2 provides an
example of ˜ αt and αt given α∗ = 0.2, c = 0 and σ = 0.2.
As in a non-perfectly credible target zone, the expected error term retains the nonlinearity, conditional
on information up to period t:




















































 , t = 1,2,...,T. (5)
Close to the center of the target zone, the expected error is zero. Agents do not anticipate the central bank to
intervene because the unrestricted probability of breaking the zone ˜ αt is small. The unrestricted distribution
is Normal with zero expected value. Close to the bounds of the zone, the expected error is non-zero. Agents
anticipate central bank to intervene reducing the probability of breaking the zone from αt to α∗. Small αt
puts large weight on a ﬁrst summand of the equation (5), which is identical to an expected error in the
perfectly credible target zone model, and so is non-zero.
The dash-dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates the S-shape of the conditional expected error in the non-
perfectly credible target zone for α∗ = 0.2 and σ = 0.2. The expected error of the non-perfectly credible
6target zone is in between of the perfectly credible expected error, the solid line, and completely unrestricted
expected error, which equals zero independent of the position in the zone. Compared to the solid line, the
error term in the non-perfectly credible zone is zero over a wider range. As the central bank relaxes the
restriction on a probability of leaving the zone and α∗ rises, the expected error term gets closer to a zero
line.
3.3 Strength of Anticipated Policy Interventions
We interpret the distance between unrestricted ˜ αt and restricted αt probabilities of breaking the target zone
as a measure of anticipated intervention strength. When a target variable is close to the center, both the
strength of anticipated intervention and a diﬀerence between restricted and unrestricted probabilities are
zero. As the target variable moves closer to the bounds, a stronger central bank intervention is needed
to bring the target back to the center. At the same time, the unrestricted probability of leaving the zone
increases. Because anticipated interventions restrict the probability to a constant α∗, higher unrestricted
probability means larger distance between unrestricted and restricted probabilities. As a result, anticipated
intervention strength can be measured by the distance between unrestricted and restricted probabilities.
As a measure of anticipated intervention strength, the distance between unrestricted and restricted
probabilities is hard to interpret. How large is an anticipated intervention that decreases the probability of
moving outside the zone from 20% to 10%? Is it equivalent to an anticipated intervention that decreases
the probability from 30% to 20%? How does a decrease in probability translate into a change in the level of
the target variable? To simplify interpretation, we translate the distance between the probabilities into the
distance between the positions of the target variable in the target zone. The distance between positions in
the zone has the same unit of measurement as the target variable.
We translate the distance between the probabilities into the distance between positions in the zone,
inverting the unrestricted probability function ˜ αt of position in the zone a(L)τt:
˜ αt = f(a(L)τt) = Φ
 
−1 − c − a(L)τt
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+ 1 − Φ
 




The function is symmetric around zero, continuous and strictly monotonic on intervals (−∞,0) and
(0,∞), thus invertible on these intervals. There is a single corresponding value of position in the zone,
f−1(˜ αt), for each value of unrestricted probability. Using the same function, we also ﬁnd the position in the
zone that corresponds to a value of restricted probability, f−1(αt). The diﬀerence between the two positions
is our measure of anticipated intervention strength.
74 Estimation Details
The model is estimated in Bayesian framework. We choose standard prior distributions for a linear regression
model except for α∗. Autoregressive parameters a1,...,ap have truncated Normal prior distribution centered
at random walk speciﬁcation with variance equal to one, where truncation is imposed to guarantee the
stationarity of the target variable. The standard deviation of error term σ has Inverted Gamma distribution
with parameters ν = 1 and s = 0.005. Prior distribution of α∗ is Beta with parameters γ and δ. We set
γ = 1, δ = 1.7 which implies almost ﬂat prior slightly favoring smaller values, the value of α∗ less than 0.5,
i.e. p(α∗ < 0.1) = 0.16 and p(α∗ < 0.4) = 0.58. Table 1 summarizes the prior distributions for the model
parameters.








































In estimation, we use the Markov Chain Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We draw parameters a1,...,ap
and α∗ using the griddy Gibbs sampling. The draw of σ is done using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
In the implementation of the algorithm, we make 20,000 draws and discard the ﬁrst 5,000 as a convergence
region. The resulting number of draws used in the estimation of parameters is 15,000.
5 Data
All countries stabilize inﬂation in a medium run (one to two years interval). A medium run is justiﬁed by
delays between the intervention and inﬂation response and by another goal of monetary policy to stabilize
the ﬂuctuations of real activity. A small increase in the interest rate decreases inﬂation, bringing it back
inside the zone with a one- or two-year delay. A large increase in the interest rate, on the other hand, can
decrease inﬂation immediately, but it negatively aﬀects real economic activity and thus is undesirable.
Medium run focus determines a choice of inﬂation measure. Monetary authorities remove short-run
ﬂuctuations from a standard Consumer Price Index (CPI). Four out of ﬁve countries that we studied remove
short run ﬂuctuations from a standard Consumer Price Index. The Bank of Canada excludes food, energy,
and the eﬀects of changes in indirect taxes from the CPI. The Bank of England excludes mortgage interest
payments. The Reserve Bank of Australia excludes interest charges prior to the September quarter 1998
and adjusts for the eﬀect of tax changes in 1999/2000. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand excludes interest
8charges. Finally, even though, Riksbank uses a standard CPI, it does not respond to short run ﬂuctuations;
Deputy Governor, Heikensten (1999) states “...certain types of transitory and sudden shocks are allowed to
aﬀect the CPI without prompting policy adjustments.”
Short run ﬂuctuations are not only removed but also are averaged out. All countries eﬀectively target
a one-year average of monthly inﬂation. A target variable is deﬁned as a year-over-year rate of change of
price level – the diﬀerence between the current price level and the price level one year ago. Such diﬀerence
is equivalent to an average of monthly inﬂation over one year:






where pt is the current price level. In the empirical model, we take the same deﬁnition of inﬂation as
monetary authorities.5
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamics of target variables inside the target zones. The data span from
December 1993 to June 2005 for Canada, from December 1994 to July 2005 for Sweden, and from October
1992 to October 2003 for the United Kingdom.6 All central banks allow inﬂation to move outside the target
zone. In Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand, inﬂation stays outside the zone for extended periods of time.
Target breaks emphasize the importance of modeling the behavior of inﬂation both inside and outside the
target zone.
6 Empirical Findings
We test the nonlinear dependence of expected error on position in the zone by evaluating the expected error
equation (5) for every realized position in the zone. After sorting realized positions from the lowest to the
highest, we get the solid lines in Figure 4.7 X-axis on each graph is the position of inﬂation inside the zone,
τt = 2(πt−1 − C)/(U − L), 1 indicates the upper limit of target zone, -1 indicates the lower limit, and 0
indicates the center of the target zone. We reject the null hypothesis of the nonlinear dependence if the 90%
highest posterior density interval (HPDI) around the estimates, the dashed lines in the Figure 4, contains
zero for all observations.
5If a true data generating process of inﬂation is a monthly price change, modeling dependent variable as a one year price
change in a linear AR model leads to autocorrelation of errors. Autocorrelated errors result in eﬃciency loss and produce larger
standard errors. Our residuals are close to the white noise.
6The United Kingdom’s target series was changed in the middle of October 2003 from RPIX to harmonized consumer price
index (HCPI).
7We report the median, the mean is less informative because many estimates are exactly equal to zero.
9Inside the target zone, the nonlinear dependence is not signiﬁcant for all ﬁve countries. Between -1 and 1,
the estimates of the expected error and the upper and lower bounds of the highest posterior density interval
are zero. Outside the zone, below -1 or above 1, evidence of the nonlinear dependence is weak. Even though
for all countries the estimates of the expected error are non-zero, they are barely signiﬁcant. For Australia,
Canada, and Sweden, the highest posterior density intervals contain zero; for the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, the intervals are close to zero.
Signiﬁcant anticipated interventions are an additional evidence of the nonlinear dependence. While the
expected error line is constructed for all time periods, the measure of anticipated intervention strength is
constructed for every time period giving more detailed evidence of the nonlinear dependence. Figure 5
reports our measure of anticipated interventions strength. The solid line reports the mean of anticipated
intervention strength; the dashed lines report the 90% highest posterior density interval. An anticipated
intervention signiﬁcantly diﬀers from zero when the restriction on probability to leave the target zone is
binding ˜ αt = α∗.
In three countries – New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK – we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect of anticipated interven-
tions. In New Zealand, agents anticipated that interventions up to 1992 would decrease inﬂation on average
by 1.5%.8 In Sweden, during the second half of 1996, the second half of 1998 and the beginning of 2003
agents anticipated that interventions would increase inﬂation on average by 1%. In the UK, agents antici-
pated that the 2000 intervention would decrease inﬂation on average by 0.4%, while the 2004 intervention
would increase inﬂation on average by 0.5%. Agents in Canada and Australia did not anticipated signiﬁcant
interventions.
The estimate of the restricted probability of the target variable to leave the zone α∗ also determines the
degree of the nonlinear dependence of expected error on the position in the zone. When α∗ is equal to 1,
the dependence is linear. More generally, an increase of α∗ lowers the degree of nonlinearity. However, this
interpretation should be used with caution. The same value of α∗ may lead to two opposite conclusions
depending on the maximum of the unrestricted probability. For example, assume that the target variable
never breaks the bounds and that α∗ equals 5%. For a target zone with bounds [−1,1], the maximum of the
unrestricted probability to move outside the target zone is approximately 33%. The unrestricted probability
is much higher than the restricted probability α∗. The large diﬀerence between probabilities implies binding
interventions and a high degree of nonlinearity. However, for a target zone with bounds [−2,2], the maximum
of the unrestricted probability is the same as the restricted probability 5%. Interventions are not binding,
and the error term is linear. Thus, to test for the nonlinear dependence, we should compare the estimate of
α∗ to the maximum of the unrestricted probabilities, max(˜ αt) − α∗. If the HPDI of max(˜ αt) − α∗ contains
zero, we reject the hypothesis of nonlinear dependence of expected error on the position in the zone.
8Y-axis on each graph is the position of inﬂation inside the zone. To facilitate the exposition we translate the position in
the zone back into inﬂation.
10Based on the estimate of the restricted probability α∗, for all ﬁve countries the nonlinear dependence is
not signiﬁcant. Table 1 reports both α∗ in ﬁfth row with 90% highest posterior interval in brackets and the
result of comparing the restricted probability to the maximum of the unrestricted probabilities in sixth row.
For all countries the upper bound of the highest posterior density interval of α∗ is close to 1. In addition,
for Australia, Canada, and Sweden, the highest posterior interval of the diﬀerence between restricted and
maximum of unrestricted probabilities contains zero rejecting nonlinearity. For New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, the lower bound of highest posterior density interval is almost zero.
We have done the robustness check for the obtained results. All results do not depend on whether inﬂation
has monthly or quarterly frequency, or whether we restrict inﬂation to be stationary process or relax the
stationarity restriction. Results are also not sensitive to the choice of lag length in equation (1).
We also have checked whether the weak evidence in support of expectation anchoring can be attributed
to the weakness of the proposed methodology. In appendix, we illustrate that the methodology is quite
successful, when we apply it to testing the expectation anchoring for the exchange rate targeting policy in
Norway. We ﬁnd very strong evidence of expectations anchoring. First, the estimate of expected error as
a function of position in the zone has a signiﬁcant S-shape. Second, the estimate of agents anticipation of
central bank interventions are signiﬁcant and coincide with actual interventions. Finally, the estimate of the
restricted probability α∗ is essentially zero.
7 Concluding Remarks
We propose the expectations anchoring test for the inﬂation targeting policy that is based on the Krugman
model. The test focuses on the fact that targeting modiﬁes the link between realized and expected inﬂation
for the very high and very low levels of inﬂation. The test avoids the critique of the benchmark approach,
because it does not require comparison between targeting and non-targeting countries. In addition to the
test, we can measure the degree of expectation anchoring and the strength of anticipated central bank
interventions.
We ﬁnd weak evidence of expectations anchoring in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. We attribute our ﬁnding to a credibility problem. Central banks often break their inﬂation
targeting promises. For example, the central banks of Australia and Sweden allow large (as far as twice the
size of the target zone) and long (as much as a year) breaks of the bounds. Such breaks undermine agents
conﬁdence in the inﬂation targeting promise: High inﬂation results in high expected inﬂation.
11Appendix: Exchange Rate Expectations Anchoring in Norway
We illustrate the methodology with the daily Norwegian exchange rate index from October 1, 1986, to June
17, 1988, Figure 3.9 During the analyzed period, the exchange rate index was allowed to ﬂuctuate within
±2.25% from its central parity. According to Mundaca (2001), Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway)
intervened at the boundaries of target zone between October 1, 1986, and June 17, 1988. The analysis of the
daily Norwegian exchange rate is a good testing ground for checking the ability of the proposed methodology
to test expectations anchoring. To the best of our knowledge, in this sample, all previous studies ﬁnd strong
evidence of nonlinear dependence of the expected exchange rate on the position in the zone.10
Let et denote the process for Norwegian exchange rate index. Then normalized target is τt = 2(et −
Ct)/(Ut −Lt). Following empirical exchange rate literature,11 we assume that exchange rate has a unit root
and estimate
△τt = c + ǫt,
We ﬁnd strong evidence of expectations anchoring. All three alternative tests conﬁrm this result. First,
the estimate of expected error as a function of position in the zone is signiﬁcantly negative close to the upper
bound, a lower right graph in Figure 4, while it is signiﬁcantly positive close to the lower bound. Second,
there are four periods when agents anticipated signiﬁcant interventions in Figure 5. Agents anticipated that
interventions between December 1986 and January 1987 and between December and January 1988 would
decrease the exchange rate, while interventions between July and October 1987 and between May and June
1988 would increase the exchange rate. The size of anticipated intervention is on average 0.6%, or 10% of
the target zone. The periods of anticipated interventions are very close to the periods of actual interventions
reported by Mundaca (2001). Finally, the estimate of α∗ is almost zero, and the highest posterior interval
of the diﬀerence between restricted and maximum of unrestricted probabilities is far above zero, with the
lower bound 0.4.
9Source: Norges Bank, http://www.norges-bank.no/english/statistics/exchange/.
10For most recent examples, see Lundberg and Terasvirta (2006) or Korenok and Radchenko (2005).
11See for example Lundberg and Terasvirta (2005), Bekaert and Gray (1998).
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14Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Prior Inﬂation Exchange Rate
Canada Sweden United Kingdom Australia New Zealand Norway
a0 N(0, 1) -0.033 -0.068 -0.003 0.046 0.205 -0.010
(0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.119) (0.063) (0.004)
a1 N(0.98,1) 0.891 0.940 0.943 0.815 0.564 0.997
(0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.087) (0.102) (0.002)
a2 N(0,1) - - - 0.114
(0.0894)
σ IG(0.005,1) 0.228 0.341 0.257 0.754 0.390 0.092
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.060) (0.025) (0.002)
α∗ Beta(γ,δ) 0.806 0.955 0.748 0.768 0.767 0.032
[0.649, 0.979] [0.915, 0.999] [0.571, 0.940] [0.535, 0.977] [0.589, 0.963] [0.007, 0.57]
max(˜ αt) − α∗ - 0.125 0.044 0.247 0.202 0.232 0.506
[-0.047, 0.284] [0.000, 0.084] [0.054, 0.424] [-0.026, 0.448] [0.036, 0.410] [0.461, 0.552]
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 90% highest posterior density intervals in square brakets.
15Figure 1: Conditional Expectation of the Error Term

























Perfectly Credible Target Zone
Non−Perfectly Credible Target Zone
Notes: Conditional expectations of the error term as function of the position in the target zone are constructed for ﬁxed σ = 0.2,
a(L) = 0 and α∗ = 0.2. On X-axis 1 indicates the upper limit of target zone, -1 indicates the lower limit, and 0 indicates the
center of the target zone.
16Figure 2: Probability of the Target to Break the Target Zone



























Notes: ˜ αt is a probability of breaking the target if agents anticipate no central bank interventions, α∗ is a constant level at
which agents anticipate monetary policy to intervene, αt is a probability of breaking the zone, which accounts for anticipated
monetary policy interventions. All probabilities are constructed for ﬁxed σ = 0.2, a(L) = 0 and α∗ = 0.2. On X-axis 1 indicates
the upper limit of target zone, -1 indicates the lower limit, and 0 indicates the center of the target zone.
17Figure 3: Dynamics of the Target in the Target Zone: Historical Observations






























Notes: Y-axis on each graph is the position of inﬂation (exchange rate for Norway) inside the zone, τt = 2(πt−1 − C)/(U − L),
1 indicates the upper limit of target zone, -1 indicates the lower limit, and 0 indicates the center of the target zone.
18Figure 4: Estimates of Conditional Expectation of the Error Term



















































































Position in the Target Zone
Norway
Notes: The estimated relation between the expected error term and the position of inﬂation (exchange rate for Norway) inside
the target zone. Solid lines denote the median of estimates (mean is less informative because a large number of estimated error
terms in MCMC draws are zero), dashed lines denote the upper and lower bound of 90% highest posterior density interval. See
also notes for Figure 1.
19Figure 5: Measure of Anticipated Intervention Strength


































Notes: Inverted distance between probability of breaking the target zone without interventions and probability of breaking
the target zone with interventions. For further details see section 3.3. Solid lines denote the median estimate of intervention
strength, dashed lines denote the upper and lower bound of 90% highest posterior density interval. See also notes for Figure 3.
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